A BLIGHT ON DEMOCRACY AND THE QLD MINING ACT Section 251 (4) of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 Under this Section, if accumulative mining impacts exceed IAS /EIS projections or the initial parameters on which the original Environmental Authority was framed, public objections may still be disallowed against the original Environmental Authority. The Act is intentionally framed to restrict public objections to just the amendment and attempted objections against the original EA will be struck out. This act not only exonerates companies with accumulative impacts from liability and public accountability but sanctions such conduct Click for document about the legislative intent of this EVIL law Contrary to procedural advice from the Minister’ Office, EEMAG, in never being permitted a right of review or appeal to the Court when the East End Mine’s original EA was considered and issued was denied ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ..... |
Entrance to East End mine |
| Promises Made Promuises Broken | |
|
1977 Irrigation & Water Supply Commision letter (Water Monitoring) DPI Water Resources 15/05/1995 2001 Testimony Land Court re: unimproved valuation objection 26 June 2008 Letter from the Minister's Office sustainsbility, Climate Change and Innovation
|
Revamping of the water monitoring scheme For many years it has been unanimously agreed that the water monitoring scheme is outdated and sadly in need of revision. The drilling of new monitoring bores has begun, but unfortunately Cement Australia has reneged on solemn commitment to consult with EEMAG and its experts. . |
Succession of Mines Ministers overreach their discretionary powers QCL’s leases expired in July 1997 and were unable to be renewed because of the mine’s entrenched dewatering impacts and non-compliance with the Special Conditions under the 1989 Mineral Resources Act. Over a six year period while the leases remained expired, respective ministers overreached their powers as the M R Act specifically states that a lessee must remain in compliance with the Act for discretion to be exercised in their favour. The only legally available option was to apply for fresh leases with full public objections etc. Instead, in the absence of any attempt to negotiate with the community or to provide an effective district remedy so as to bring the company back into compliance, the Authorities fudged on the compliance criteria and proceeded with lease renewal on the false premise that dewatering effects had not migrated off-lease. Under the Mineral Resources Act public objections are not permitted at lease renewal. |
EPA bends the rules and rescues the mine In approval or renewal of a mining lease the issuing of an Environmental Authority by EPA precedes grant of lease by the Mines Department. On 10 August 2001, EPA in their new role as “environmental custodians?” initiated an application to amend a Transitional Environmental Authority for unexpired ML 80002 to increase the area of disturbance for waste rock disposal. EPA ruled the1996 EIS (with its reliance upon a report that stated mine induced water depletion extended “approx 500 metres from the pit” I.e. that impacts were basically constrained within the mining lease boundary) was still valid. Quote from Oct 2001 EPA memorandum, “the application for a non-standard did not involve a significant increase in environmental harm (and that meant there was no need to consider whether a EIS was required.” EPA attached the four expired mining leases (with 33 sq km of off-lease dewatering impacts) to the contaminated 1996 EMOS and on 30 April 2002 issued Cement Australia with an amendment for a whole of project Environmental Authority that sanctioned the company’s operation under conditions entirely unrepresentative of widespread environmental impacts. In contradiction of “no significant increase in environmental harm” pump-out discharges under recharge conditions were increased from 6 to 10 megalitres a day. EPA’s assessment lacked rigour, and their approvals a legal pathway. In 2003, retrospective legislation was enacted to bring EPA’s actions and the Company’s EA into legal conformity. Once the Environmental Authority was issued, the Mines Minister (in keeping with Cabinet’s “Minimum compliance” commitment I.e. (that only changes agreed to in consultation with the mine can be implemented) instructed the Department of Natural Resources & Mines to “renew the leases in consultation with the Company.” Note: public objections are not permitted against lease renewal. Click for details of the Ombudsman’s role. Special Conditions were weakened at lease renewal.
|
|
The Criminal Justice Commission relied on an escape clause in their legislation so as not to act; while the Qld Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over either a Minister’s or Cabinet decision….there is no controlling body above the Ombudsman other than the Governor-in Council who appoints the Ombudsman. Click for CJC and Ombudsman’s responses In 2003 the Premier and Ministers blackballed EEMAG. Thereafter they said, Authorities would deal only with individual landholders. Click for letters from Premier and Ministers In 2005 EEMAG initiated meetings with the Mine, DNR&M and EPA. EEMAG then met with the CEO and members of the Cement Australia Board and presented them with a long list of neglected and aggrieved landholders. Click for landholder grievances and reply from Cement Australia. |
|
Under the Special Conditions relating to the Water Monitoring Scheme: Under the original Special Conditions attached at 1976 grant of lease, the Department of Natural Resources supervised the water monitoring scheme and acted as technical advisors to lead Agency, Department of Mines and Energy. In the advent of a dispute between the mine and a landholder DNR acted as arbiter. (As parties to the dispute from 1995 onwards, DNR retained their “Arbiter” role despite an obvious conflict of interest!) With passage of the EPOLA Bill on 1 January 2001 environmental responsibility passed to the Environmental Protection Agency. Since 2001, these three Agencies have supervised the East End mine. DNR used a Cement Australia consultant’s map (Feb 2000) of the 33 sq km “mine pit zone of influence” in determining landholder “make good” entitlements while EPA used the 1995-96 IAS/EIS to deny the very existence of off- lease environmental impacts and values. Click for enlightening minutes arising out of EEMAG’s 2005 meetings with Cement Australia, DNR&M and EPA showing no one was taking responsibility for environmental values and impacts. |
Prescribing of Environmental Values Newly merged Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) do not recognise local limestone aquifers as karst or attribute an environmental value to groundwater level loss within the approximately 50 sq kilometre “make good” zone at East End recently updated by the Department of Natural Resources for landholder replacement supplies; where off-lease, surface and interconnected groundwater levels have suffered losses in excess of 20 metres; and perennial sections of some streams, springs and eco-systems has suffered terminal decline. Examine Cement Australia’s sterile Environmental Authorities.and observe absence of environmental values, or measures to combat widespread, off-lease dewatering impacts other than for a vague reference to the final mine pit void (after mining ceases in the indeterminable future!) |
Administrative Agencies evade responsibility for payment of compensation under “injurious affection The original Special Conditions were selectively interpreted by Regulating Agencies so as to evade administrative responsibility for payment of compensation to affected landholders for property devaluation caused by mine dewatering. The Regulating Agencies failed to adequately service affected landholders entitled to replacement of a water supply at the company’s expense….. even when it is agreed that a landholder is entitled to a replacement water supply at the company’s expense, unreasonable delays, only partially fulfilled obligations and high levels of frustration routinely occur..… the “make good” conditions have proven INEFFECTUAL. Click for examples of default, landholder frustrations and administrative laxity.
|
|
O series of bores 1978-2009. Note only Bore 03 (blue line) lies in the heavily mine depleted East End aquifer. Despite different metres on the left hand side of the graphs, note similarity in pattern between Bore 03 (loss over 20 m) and Deviation from Mean Rainfall Chart.
|
Typical hydrograph Bracewell limestone bores from 1977. Note oscillating pattern at reduced aquifer levels from 1993 -2007 with little or no relationship with deviation from mean rainfall graph.
|
Note and compare rainfall graph 1993-2007 with hydrographs of B03 at East End and with B35 Bracewell.
|
EEMAG wins unimproved valuation objections in the Land Court In response to concerns over water access difficulties and Departmental revelations that the water monitoring data had been collected but not analysed between 1980 and 1995 coupled with a proposed $220M mine expansion saw EEMAG Inc formed at a public meeting on 1 September 1995. As the dispute between EEMAG, the Regulatory Agencies and the company escalated, regional adverse publicity caused property sales to dry up and values to plummet. In 1999 DNR announced a 25% unimproved valuation increase of all Primary Industry classified land right across the Shire. EEMAG saw this as a cynical ploy to undermine landholders’ rights to compensation under injurious affection. |
Drafting of the Special Conditions condones bias of CEO. |
|
No available process to appeal the merit of Regulating Agencies’ decisions: Click on legal opinion and other documents The absence of any merits appeal process protects and insulates Departmental reports shaped to fit political agreements from effective challenge…. …..the same applies to administration of COAG Agreements on Water Reform and the National Water Initiative despite EEMAG’s numerous submissions to the Productivity Commission, National Water Commission, the Queensland Attorney General etc on the need for a merits review process to safeguard landholders’ access to water supplies, so that the best available science IS used and disputes over equity and disputes over science are effectively remedied.
|
|
“because the samples were not properly purged prior to collection.” Note: (Department of Natural Resources and Department of Mines and Energy) were responsible for supervising data collection. EEMAG considers that water quality in the chronically depleted Bracewell limestone aquifer, has deteriorated.
|
Selective and falsely benchmarked science Learn how experts associated with the Regulating Agencies and Cement Australia’s East End mine misclassify the interconnected karst limestone aquifer system as Darcian flow and use selective and inappropriate Darcian flow methodology (invalid for a karst limestone aquifer system with conduit flows) and over emphasise drought to produce reports that suppress the rights and entitlements of landholders affected by off-lease mine dewatering impacts…these reports do not recognise mine impacts upon the alluvium and Bracewell limestone aquifers (that are affected to a lesser degree than East End.) Endeavours within Cement Australia’s 2008-2009 Annual Water Monitoring Report to have Bracewell designated “a non affected control area” for purposes of comparison with “the mine affected East End aquifer” is a lame attempt at absolving the mine from responsibility for about a 5 metre recharge shortfall at Bracewell while simultaneously superimposing an inflated “drought component” upon the mine affected East End aquifer. .Prof. Volker's Study into Groundwater Impacts at Bracewell August 1998 Assoc. Prof. Brian Finlayson Observation upon East End Ground water Impacts August 2007 Assoc. Prof. Brian Finlayson Comments on DNR Draft Hydrology Review of East end Mine Jan 2008 D.J. Smith, Dr. P James, Assoc. Prof. Finlayson jointly signed letter Sept 2007 EEMAG / D.J. Smith Abbreviated dye tracing report May 2002 D.J. Smith Response to DNR Draft Ground Water Review Jan 2009 Dr. P James Responses to DNR Ground Water Review & other letters 2002 - 2009 EEMAG response to DNR Draft Ground Water Review Feb 2008 Brady Comparisons District Irrigation 1980 / 2000
|
Same site with drilling rig now in dry, fine grained marblised limestone.
|
|
|
|
Under “minimum compliance,” only changes agreed to by the mine can be initiated. Regulating Agencies (as parties to the dispute) engage in placebo consultation, and EEMAG’s delegates and technical experts are NOT empowered. The Department of Natural Resources and Water (now DERM) exercises strict editorial control and right of veto over inputs and as a matter of policy utilises only its own and Cement Australia’s findings derived from Darcian flow methodology when compiling technical reports that serve to minimise landholder’s “make good” entitlements. DERM’s most recent report contains a disclaimer. See page 166 (Chapter 9.19) where contingent decisions must be agreed to by the mine. See pages 130 to 135 (Chapter 8.40 to 8.45) Re failed East End Mine Community Liasion group 1996 - 2000.
|
Once permanent section of Machine Creek that is now at best seasonal
|
Scrub Creek breaks its banks & invades the flood plain Feb 2003
|
Loopholes in COAG Agreements on Water Reform and the National Water Initiative permit mine dewatering to be exempt while requiring competing farmers to comply…. EEMAG’s submission to the 2005 National Water Commission’s Water Reform Assessment supplied copious evidence that the best available science was NOT used for Calliope River WRP and that Queensland’s 1995 incentive agreement with QCL (Cement Australia) facilitates East End mine to be exempt from Water Reforms. Conversion of water licenses to allocations under Water Resources Plans and Resource Operations Plans facilitates ownership of pit discharge water to be accorded to the mine. Calliope River WRP (approved by the Commonwealth) sanctions trade-off of the bulk of the water resources accessible to small landholders in East End / Bracewell subcatchment area to the East End mine, by use of inaccurate science and false benchmarking of the mine’s Environmental Authority. Calliope WRP is coordinated with the mine’s Environmental Authority under “standard criteria”. Contrary to the principles of National Competition Policy, “Minimum compliance” amounts to affected landholders being regulated to subsidise the East End mine through failure to properly redress mine impacts NWC Water Reform Assessment Submission 14/9/2005 NWC Request for witholding final Tranche payment
|
Discrimination against landholders not appealable under Australian Human Rights Commission Farmers’ fundamental Human Rights (without any discrimination) to fairness and justice and to an effective remedy are NOT protected under administrative compliance processes for COAG Agreements on Water Reform/National Competition Policy that we allege are weighted in favour of mining companies. As small farmers (isolated, weak-voiced persons of rural social origin and property) we are not eligible to access the Human Rights appeals process. Click for response from the Australian Human Rights Commission dated 2 December 2008.
|
Scrub Creek road crossing Feb 2003
|
